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DELEGATION OF POWER OR
THE "WAKING OF A SLEEPING
GIANT?"
United Transportation Union v. Southern California
Rapid Transit'
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration to resolve labor disputes has become an irreplaceable
method of dispute resolution in private enterprises and corporations all over the
United States. Arbitration's popularity has come about partially from a realization
of the utility of arbitration and partially from government pressure through the
enactment of federal statutes. However, the government itself has resisted the
imposition of arbitration to resolve disputes between its agencies and their
employees. This Note will address some of the issues involved in private
arbitration of public agency labor disputes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
The controversy leading to this case arose out of a maternity leave dispute
between Southern California Rapid Transit (District), a public agency, and the
United Transportation Union (Union) regarding one of the District's employees.2
Cyndi Ortega was a part-time employee of the District and a member of the
Union On June 10, 1989, Ms. Ortega began a pregnancy-related leave of
1. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
2. Id at 703. Rapid Transit is a government controlled public transportation service. Id at 706.
3. Id at 703. Ms. Ortega was a bus operator. Id
1
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absence from her job in accordance with government regulations.' Her leave was
not to exceed four months.' Due to the necessity of a Cesarean birth, Ms.
Ortega's physician did not release her to return to work until November of 1989,
more than five months after her leave of absence began.6 When her four month
absenceperiod had lapsed, the District began taking action regarding Ms. Ortega's
extended absence.7 In October, 1989, the District wrote Ms. Ortega a letter
requesting her to return to work.8 In the letter, the District informed Ms. Ortega
that, as a part-time employee, she was not covered under Article 31 of the Union's
collective bargaining agreement which addressed employee leaves of absence.9
The District also informed Ms. Ortega that she would be considered to have
resigned from her job if she did not return to work immediately."0
On behalf of Ms. Ortega, the Union set in motion grievance proceedings
against the District as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. " After
grievance remedies were exhausted, the Union demanded arbitration of the dispute
pursuant to the agreement, but the District refused to honor this demand. 2 The
Union then filed a petition in California state court to compel the District to
arbitrate the dispute.13 The District denied the existence of an arbitrable dispute
since it deemed Ms. Ortega to have "constructively resigned" her position. 4 In
addition, the District argued that since it was a public agency, it could not be
compelled to arbitrate a labor dispute.'5 In agreeing with both of the District's
arguments, the trial court denied the Union's petition to compel arbitration on
March 29, 1991,16 and the Union appealed.
17
4. Id Specifically, the leave of absence was permitted by California Government Code § 12940.
Id
5. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
6. Id. The court does not address the issue of whether Ms. Ortega's physician unnecessarily held
back a release for her to return to work. Id.
7. Id
8. Id Rapid Transit had also sent Ms. Ortega a letter in September to notify her that her four
month leave period was over at that time. Id.
9. Id In Article 31 § I(d), the collective bargaining agreement provides that pregnant employees
are allowed leaves of absence of up to one year. But, Article 50, which addresses part-time employees,
does not adopt any of Article 31 's provisions. Id.
10. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. Ms. Ortega did not return to work until November
pursuant to her physician's advice. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes in Article
26, "Filing Claims-Procedure-Limitations." Specifically, § 7 of Article 26 states, "If the claim is not
satisfactorily settled and the Union desires, the claim may be submitted to arbitration upon the Union's
request." Id at 705.
13. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
14. Id See also Footnote 3 of the court's opinion. Id at 705 n.3.
15. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
16. Id at 703.
17. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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The California Court of Appeals, Second District, reversed the trial court's
decision.' 8 In doing so, the Court of Appeals held: (1) the Union's petition to
compel arbitration should have been granted as Ms. Ortega's case is a claim,
dispute, or controversy arising out of the application and interpretation of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement; 9 (2) the District's contention that
the federal policy preferring resolution of labor disputes through arbitration only
applies to private organizations and not government entities is an incorrect
assumption; 0 and (3) the District did not waive its right to object to arbitration
in court by completely complying with pre-arbitration grievance procedures.2'
This Note will discuss the Court of Appeal's second holding relating to the
District's status as a public agency.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The movement toward the arbitration of labor disputes was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in a series of cases commonly referred to as the
"Steelworkers Trilogy."22  In these cases, the Court held that there is a
presumption in favor of arbitrating labor disputes pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements,23 and that there is a general public policy favoring the use of
arbitration to resolve such disputes.24 However, all of the employers in the
21
"Steelworkers Trilogy" cases were private organizations. When a public entity
or agency is the employer, the presumption in favor of arbitrating labor disputes
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements has created considerable controversy.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, many state appellate
and high courts have come to conflicting conclusions on this issue.26
18. Id.
19. Id at 706.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Arm v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
24. rd. at 583.
25. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 564; Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 574; Enterprise Wheel, 363
U.S. at 593.
26. See Taylor v. Crane, 595 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1979); Dearborn Firefighter's Union v. City of
Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975); Acting Superintendent of Sch. v. United Liverpool Faculty
Ass'n, 369 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1977); Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1969); City of Warwick v.
Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n
of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977); State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
19931
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A. California Decisions
Since the instant case arose in California state courts, a brief review of
California decisions on the issue of arbitration of labor disputes by public agencies
is in order.
The District based its argument against arbitration of labor disputes involving
public agencies on the case of Service Employees International Union v. County
of Napa.27 In Service Employees, a civil service employee of the state was
denied a merit salary step increase due to poor job performance. 2' The employee
filed a grievance with the county which was heard and denied. 29 Next, the
Service Employees Union became involved in the dispute, and it contended that
the denial of a salary increase was subject to arbitration under the County's
collective bargaining agreement with the Union." When the County refused to
arbitrate, the Union filed a motion to compel arbitration in district court.3 The
district court proceeded to deny the Union's motion.
2
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.33
First, the court decided that government entities and agencies were not covered by
the "Steelworkers Trilogy" principles because the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), upon which those decisions were based, did not include the
government in its definition of "employer."34 Consequently, only private entities
were subject to the presumption in favor of arbitration for resolving labor
disputes.35 Second, the court determined that arbitration in public employment
forums does not carry the same general or historical acceptance as it does in
private corporations due to constitutional limitations.36 The court explained that
most state constitutions, including California's, have general clauses in them
vesting governmental power in chosen representatives. 7 In addition, many state
constitutions, including California's, have specific clauses granting counties broad
27. 160 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
28. Id at 812. The merit salary step increase was provided for in the "Memorandum of
Understanding" agreement between the Union and Napa County which was approved by the county
council. The increase was only given to employees whose performance was considered satisfactory.
Id. at 811.




33. Id at 816.
34. See Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). See also Lodge
2424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. United States, 564 F.2d 66, 71-72 (CL Ct.
1977).
35. Service Employees, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
36. Id (citing Liverpool, 369 N.E.2d at 749).
37. See CAL. CONST. art II, § 1. See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1, which states, "All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ......
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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power over their employees,3 as well as clauses restricting the delegation of that
power to private parties.39 As such, the court explained, the delegation to private
arbitrators of the power to resolve labor disputes in the public sector is a violation
of the California Constitution.4"
Finally, the Service Employees court determined that forcing arbitration on
an unwilling public entity serves "no sound public policy."41 The court adopted
the view that whatever was not expressly included in the bargaining agreement
was not intended to be subject to arbitration.42 Specifically, since there was no
clause providing for arbitration of grievances involving denials of salary increases,
such grievances are excluded from resolution by an arbitrator.43 Thereafter, the
Service Employees court denied compulsory arbitration of the public agency
employee's grievance against his employer."
The Union in the instant case based its argument in favor of arbitration on
the California Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Crane.45 In Taylor, a police
officer was fired for violating a police regulation restricting the use of firearms in
the course of duty.46 Pursuant to his employment contract, the officer invoked
grievance proceedings against the City of Berkeley.47  After grievance
proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, both parties agreed to submit the case to
arbitration.' The arbitrator reduced the punishment of the officer to a temporary
suspension, but the city refused to honor the arbitrator's decision.49 The
Berkeley Police Officer's Union filed suit on behalf of the officer to force the
city's compliance with the arbitrator's decision, but the district court denied the
requested relief.50 However, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower
38. CAL CONST. art. XI, § 1(b) provides that each county's "governing body shall provide for
the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of [its] employees."
39. CAL CONST. art. XI, § 11(a) provides: "Tle Legislature may not delegate to a private person
... [plower to... [clontrol... [o]r interfere with county or municipal [m]atters...."
40. Service Employees, 160 CaL Rptr. at 814-15.
41. Id at 815.
42. Id at 816.
43. Id The court noted that arbitration of disputes is a matter of contract, so a party cannot be
forced to arbitrate a dispute which is not expressly provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Id
44. Id In its discussion, the Service Employees court also distinguished Taylor v. Crane, 595
P.2d 129 (Cal. 1979), which was decided by the California Supreme Court earlier the same year. Id
at 815.
45. 595 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1979).
46. Id at 130-3 1. The officer, Charles Crane, shot and wounded a person he suspected was
burglarizing his friend's car. Mr. Crane was off-duty at the time of the incident Id at 130.
47. Id at 131. The officer's employment contract was a "Memorandum of Understanding"
agreement between the police officer's union and the city similar to the agreement in Service
Employees. Id at 133.
48. Id at 13 1. The arbitrator was an independent California attorney. Id
49. Id
50. Id The district court determined that under the city's charter, the city manager had the
exclusive power to discipline city employees, and that a private arbitrator's ruling conflicted with that
power. Id See supra notes 38, 39.
19931
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court by compelling the City of Berkeley to honor the arbitrator's decision."
In finding for the Union, the California Supreme Court rejected the city's
argument that resolution of this particular dispute by arbitration was
impermissible.52 Specifically, the Taylor court concluded that in the absence of
a prohibition of arbitration in the collective bargaining agreement, the issue was
subject to compulsory arbitration.53 The court went on to note the public policy
advantages of resolving labor disputes through arbitration, including the easing of
burdens on the courts and the quick, inexpensive resolution of such disputes.54
Finally, the court rejected the city's "unconstitutional delegation of power"
argument." Under the collective bargaining agreement, the city manager retains
the power to initially impose discipline on city employees.5 6 Only after the
initial proceedings fail does the arbitration provision take effect, so there is no
"total abdication" of disciplinary authority to a private arbitrator." According
to the court, since the city still had power to set the terms and conditions of
employment while the arbitrator simply resolved individual issues, the city's power
over its employees remained intact.5" Based on the previous arguments, the
Taylor court held that the City of Berkeley must comply with the arbitrator's
decision to reduce the officer's punishment to a suspension.59
The court in Service Employees distinguished the Taylor decision in two
respects.60 First, the Service Employees court noted that the collective bargaining
agreement and city charter in Taylor expressly provided for arbitration review of
employee disciplinary matters.61 In addition, the Service Employees court
declared that the City of Berkeley initially agreed to the "significant participation"
of an arbitrator, while Napa County never accepted an arbitrator as part of the
grievance resolution process.62 Therefore, the Service Employees court was able
to distinguish Taylor v. Crane, a strikingly similar case.63
51. Taylor, 595 P.2d at 136.
52. Id.
53. Id. Note that the exact opposite conclusion was reached by the Service Employees court
which prohibited arbitration of public agency labor disputes in the absence of express provisions
allowing arbitration to resolve the particular issue.
54. Id. at 135.
55. Id. See supra note 39.
56. Taylor, 595 P.2d at 134-35.
57. Id at 135 (citing Kugler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303 (Cal. 1968)).
58. Id. at 136. The court states that "the arbitrator's role is confined to interpreting and applying
terms which the employer itself has created or agreed to .... " Id
59. Id.
60. Service Employees, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
61. Id. The Service Employees court also noted that the collective bargaining agreement in that
case did not provide for arbitration of salary increase issues. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Crane, 595 P.2d at 135).
63. Id.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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B. Other State Court Decisions
Outside of California, the high courts of several other states have grappled
with the issue of compulsory arbitration of public sector labor disputes.' Like
the decisions of the California state courts, these other state court decisions are
highly inconsistent with each other; some have held that arbitration is preferable
in public as well as private sector labor disputes,65 while others have held that
such decision making by private arbitrators is prohibited.' But, there is one
common thread that weaves its way through all of these cases: the importance
placed upon the constitutional issue of delegating legislative power to resolve
public sector disputes through private arbitrators.67
Such delegation of legislative power to private individuals was consistently
considered unconstitutional until the rise of the administrative agency concept
earlier this century." Administrative agencies inevitably changed the view that
government powers cannot be delegated, and, as such, the courts have had to keep
up with the modem trend toward allowing such delegation of power in accordance
with the Constitution.69
In addition to the California Supreme Court decision in Taylor, two other
state supreme courts have held such delegation of power to private arbitrators to
be constitutional. In State v. City of Laramie,7 ° the local firefighters union filed
suit against the city to compel the city to comply with the Wyoming statute
governing relations between state and municipal governments and their
employees.7' The city defended its refusal to comply with the statute on the
ground that the statute required an unconstitutional delegation of public authority
to private arbitrators.72 The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed with the city in
upholding the statute." First, the court held that arbitration is not a municipal
function since arbitration concerning public employees is not fundamentally
different from arbitration in business and industrial settings.74 The court also
held that arbitration panels do not make the law, but merely execute it; therefore,
64. See supra note 26. See also Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public
Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Harney, 255 A.2d at 560; Warwick, 256 A.2d at 206; Laramie, 437 P.2d at 295.
66. See, e.g., Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 226; Liverpool, 369 N.E.2d at 746; Salt Lake City, 563
P.2d at 786.
67. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
68. 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADINISTRATIVE LAW 46-48 (1965).
69. Id.
70. 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
71. Id at 298. See also WYO. STAT. § 27 (1965), which sets forth a collective bargaining
agreement plan for Wyoming state and municipal governments and their employees.
72. Laramie, 437 P.2d at 299. The Wyoming Constitution states: "The legislature shall not
delegate to any special commissioner ... any power to make, supervise, or interfere with any
municipal improvements... moneys, property or effects.... or to perform any municipal functions
whatever." WYO. CONST. art. III, § 37.
73. Laramie, 437 P.2d at 301.
74. Id. at 300.
1993]
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no unconstitutional delegation of authority occurs when private arbitrators settle
public agency disputes."
A similar conclusion was reached, but for different reasons, in City of
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass n.76 In this case, as in Laramie, the
City of Warwick challenged the constitutionality of compulsory, binding
arbitration agreements between the city and the Firemen's Association made
pursuant to provisions in Rhode Island state statutes.77 The city argued that
private arbitrators may not exercise unconstitutionally delegated legislative power
in accordance with the state constitution."7 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in
reversing the lower court, concluded that the powers exercised by the arbitrator
were not unconstitutional since the arbitrators were public officers who collectively
constituted a governmental agency.79 Since the sovereign allocated power to
arbitrators without retaining any supervision over the exercise of that power, the
arbitrators were considered to be an independent public agency.' So, even
though the Warwick court's conclusion was the same as that in Laramie, the logic
used to find constitutional the delegation of power to the arbitrators was very
different.
The supreme courts in a number of states have declared that compulsory
arbitration of labor disputes between public agencies and their employees is an
unconstitutional delegation of power to private parties.81 The leading case
supporting this view is Dearborn Firefighter's Union v. City of Dearborn.' In
Dearborn, the City of Dearborn and the Union were in the process of negotiating
a new labor agreement when the parties reached an impasse.8 3  When
negotiations and mediation failed to produce a solution, the* Union initiated
arbitration proceedings pursuant to a Michigan statute." The city refused to
choose any delegates to serve on the arbitration panel as the statute required, and
the Association filed suit to get the city to comply with the terms of the statute. 5
In reversing both lower court decisions, the Michigan Supreme Court held the
compulsory arbitration statute unconstitutional.' In a plurality opinion, the court
determined that the arbitrators were entrusted with the authority to determine the
75. Id at 301. A similar argument was set forth in Taylor v. Crane. See supra note 58.
76. 256 A.2d 206 (R.L 1969).
77. Id. at 207. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 1956, chap. 28-9.1-9 (1956).
78. Warwick, 256 A.2d at 209. (citing Opinion to the Governor, 162 A.2d 802 (1960)).
79. Id This reasoning has been criticized as "beg[ging] the question and reduc[ing] the analysis
of the issue to a reason-free debate over labels." Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 232.
80. Warwick, 256 A.2d at 210.
81. See supra note 66.
82. 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975).
83. Id at 228.
84. Id. See MIC. CoMP. LAWS § 423.231 (1963).
85. Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 228. Under the terms of the statute, the Association and the city
were each to appoint delegates to the panel who would then choose further panel members themselves.
Therefore, the city's refusal to appoint delegates halted the entire arbitration process. Id
86. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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outcome of public policy matters concerning the terms and conditions of
employment, the proper standards to which public employees are held, and the
allocation of public revenues."' The plurality concluded that such matters were
not judicial, but legislative in natureas As such, the statute's approval of private
arbitrators not subject to the political process was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power.' In other words, these matters were public issues which
should have been decided by public officials who are accountable to the public."°
A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Williams, did not view the delegation
of public authority to the arbitrator as an open and shut case of an unconstitutional
statute.9 Justice Williams preferred to employ a balancing test which weighed
the public policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes against the dangers of
entering sacred legislative territory as protected by the Constitution.' Using this
balancing test, the arbitration method in Dearborn was constitutional because: (1)
the panel chairman was selected by a public commission; (2) the arbitration was
conducted subject to specific standards and was subject to immediate judicial
review; (3) the arbitration panel itself was subject to public scrutiny which made
it publicly accountable to some extent; and (4) the arbitrators had limited, well-
defined powers.93
The New York Court of Appeals has also had the opportunity to decide the
public agency arbitration issue. In Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United
Liverpool Faculty Ass 'n,94 (relied on by the California Court of Appeals in
Service Employees), an elementary school teacher was placed on involuntary leave
of absence after refusing to comply with procedures required upon her return from
a medical leave of absence. 95 The Liverpool Faculty Association instituted
grievance proceedings against the school district on behalf of the teacher.96 After
the proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, the Association demanded arbitration
of the matter pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, but the school
district refused to comply." The school district was granted a stay of arbitration
by the district court.9 '
87. Id.
88. Id
89. Id See also MICH CONST. art. VII, §§ 22, 34.
90. See Kanowitz, supra note 64, at 299.
91. Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 252 (Williams, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 267. Justice Williams believed that the issue was "what the people can or cannot give
away" in the delegation of sovereign authority. Id
93. Id at 263.
94. 369 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1977).
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The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion,"
but not on constitutional grounds. The court concluded that arbitration had not yet
gained the acceptance in the public sector as it had in the private sector."° ° The
court then held that arbitration was not applicable to the underlying dispute
involved since the collective bargaining agreement did not "clearly and
unequivocally" refer to involuntary leave of absence disputes. 1" The law, as
interpreted by the New York court at that time, only allowed arbitration in the
public sector between two willing, voluntary participants."w  Therefore,
arbitration could not be forced upon the school district.'0 3
From this overview of the legal background in the area of public agency
arbitration of labor disputes, it is difficult to find any consistent standards from
which to make a correct decision. However, this is the background against which
the Rapid Transit court had to decide whether Ms. Ortega's grievance was subject
to compulsory arbitration.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In United Transportation Union v. Southern California Rapid Transit,104 the
California Court of Appeals first discussed the reasoning and conclusion of the
Service Employees case.0 5 First, Justice Croskey, writing for a unanimous court,
noted that the District was relying on the Service Employees decision in arguing
against arbitration of the Union's grievance on behalf of Ms. Ortega. 0 6 Justice
Croskey then explained the reasoning of the Service Employees court in reaching
its conclusion that arbitration cannot be a matter of compulsion in public sector
labor disputes.0 7 Next, Justice Croskey and the court completely rejected "the
whole of the analysis" of the finding in the Service Employees case.'0 8
To begin, the court noted that the general rule in California shows a
preference for arbitration of disputes between local public agencies and their
employees."° Citing the Taylor decision, the court set forth the advantages of
resolving labor disputes through arbitration, such as an ease of the burdens on the
courts and the quick, inexpensive resolution of labor disputes."0 After referring
99. Id
100. Id at 749.
101. Id. at 750.
102. Id at 748.
103. Id. at 750.
104. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702.
105. Id. at 706.
106. Id
107. Id See the discussion in "Legal Background," supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text,
for a detailed synopsis of the court's reasoning in Service Employees.
108. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707.
109. Id
110. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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to the historical preference for arbitration of labor disputes, as first stated in the
"Steelworkers Trilogy," the court noted California's acceptance of this historical
preference."' Next, Justice Croskey adopted the conclusion in Taylor that, in
the absence of an express provision removing a particular issue from resolution by
arbitration, the issue will be subject to arbitration if even broad provisions provide
for it in the labor contract." 2
The court went on to reject specific parts of the holding in Service
Employees."3 It rejected the restrictive definition given the word "employer"
in accordance with the Labor Management Relations Act." 4 Instead, the court
reiterated California's preference for arbitration of all labor disputes.' The
court also stated its rejection of the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals
in Liverpool as relied upon by the Service Employees court."6
Finally, Justice Croskey concluded that the District was not an "unwilling
public entity", and that the District had the opportunity to consider the potential
consequences of the inclusion of a broad arbitration clause in its agreement with
its employees." 7 The court stated that it considered the District's interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement to be incorrect, and ordered the district to
submit Ms. Ortega's case to arbitration." 8
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Id. at 707-08.
114. Id at 707; see also Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
115. Rapid Transit, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707-08.
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V. COMMENT
A. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning in the
Instant Decision
The Rapid Transit court was correct in requiring the District to submit to
arbitration with the Union pursuant to the Union's grievance on behalf of Ms.
Ortega."19 This observation is based upon the California Supreme Court's
precedent in requiring arbitration of such grievances in Taylor. 2° However, the
Rapid Transit court gives little actual legal reasoning for its decision other than
the rejection of the decision in Service Employees. 12
Unlike the Service Employees court, the Rapid Transit court determined that
public policy is best served by arbitration of public agency labor disputes.'22 In
essence, the Rapid Transit court saw no difference between arbitrating labor
disputes in the private sector and arbitrating similar disputes in the public sector
as long as a collective bargaining agreement was involved."2 The similarity
between the public policies served 'in resolving both public and private labor
disputes seemed to be the court's preeminent reason for requiring the arbitration
of the Union's grievance against the District. 124 But, while public policy was
good support for a judicial decision, it does not answer the legal questions raised
which initially brought the case before a tribunal.
Most notably absent from the court's analysis was a discussion of the
constitutional issues involved in the delegation of governmental power to a private
arbitrator. While the court noted the Service Employees court's reliance on the
unconstitutional delegation of power in its decision to deny arbitration,2 5 the
court did not explain why it rejected the Service Employees court's interpretation
of this issue. There are some possible reasons why the court did not address this
issue in more detail. First, the court could have been adopting the California
Supreme Court's reasoning in Taylor on the constitutional issue. 126 Conversely,
the court could have been avoiding the constitutional issue altogether. Given the
many varied state court opinions on the issue, the court's reluctance to address it
would not be surprising. However, it was precisely the delegation of power issue
which made the legal reasoning of the Rapid Transit court less than satisfactory.
119. Id at 707.
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id The court reasoned that arbitration is a "favored means of resolving labor disputes in
this state [because it] eases the burdens on courts while resolving disputes quickly and inexpensively."
Id (citing Taylor, 595 P.2d at 129).
123. See id at 708.
124. Id
125. Id at 706-07.
126. See supra note 58.
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As such, a comparison of the other state court opinions on the constitutional
delegation of power issue is necessary.
B. An Analysis of the Delegation of Power Issue
in State Courts
In Taylor, the California Supreme Court dealt with the delegation of power
issue in much the same manner as the Wyoming Supreme Court in Laramie. In
determining that private arbitrators were not exercising governmental authority in
settling public sector labor disputes, the Laramie court held that such arbitrators
merely execute the law but do not actually make it.' Similarly, the Taylor
court determined that the arbitrator's role in settling these disputes was limited to
interpreting and applying the employment terms which the government agency
created and agreed to implement.12A Therefore, grievance arbitration did not
involve the making of general public policy, and arbitrators did not exercise any
public policy-making power.1 29 Both courts seem to have made the assumption
that the limited amount of power given to an arbitrator resolving public sector
labor disputes did not even raise a constitutional issue. While this argument
makes sense given the facts of the Taylor and Laramie cases, grievance arbitrators
may be given different amounts of personal discretion depending on the case
involved. So, even if the discretion exercised by the arbitrators in Taylor and
Laramie was not an unconstitutional delegation of governmental power, no
precedential standard was set forth for guidance in future cases.'3 Because no
standard was determined, the Taylor and Laramie courts' decisions regarding the
constitutionality of using private arbitrators to resolve public sector labor disputes
seemed incomplete.
By contrast, the courts in Service Employees and Dearborn both viewed the
resolution of public agency labor disputes by private arbitrators as a clearviolation
of the Constitution. 3 ' The Service Employees court dismissed the argument that
the arbitrators were not unconstitutionally exercising legislative power simply by
emphasizing that "all power is vested in the people and their chosen
representatives.' 2 In Dearborn, the court offered a lengthy discussion about
the constitutional issue, but determined that without public accountability, a private
arbitrator's involvement in a public sector dispute was unquestionably
unconstitutional. 33  The court gave a very narrow definition to "public
127. Laramie, 437 P.2d at 301.
128. Taylor, 595 P.2d at 136.
129. Id
130. See Kanowitz, supra note 64, at 299. Kanowitz argues that the reasoning of the Laramie
court "overlooks the precedential effect of an initial award upon negotiated and arbitrated settlements
in other parts of the public sector... ." Id
131. Service Employees, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 814; Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 241-42.
132. Service Employees, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (citing CAL CONST. art II, § 1).
133. Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 241.
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accountability" by equating it only with the citizens' right to vote. 134 Both the
Service Employees and Dearborn majorities seem to have made very inflexible
decisions. According to these courts, compulsory private arbitration of public
sector labor disputes is never constitutional, even if the public agency is quite
remote from the exercise of any real governmental power.
C. An Alternative Solution
Justice Williams' dissent in Dearborn seems to be the most pragmatic view
of the delegation of powers issue in the arbitration of public agency labor
disputes.' 3  Justice Williams based his opinion on Professor Frank Cooper's
treatise STATE ADMINISTRATIw LAW,1 36 which set forth the basis for the
"balancing test" advocated by Williams in Dearborn.37
Professor Cooper's treatise dealt with the delegation of governmental power
to public agencies generally, not just in the labor arbitration area. 3 ' In effect,
Professor Cooper rejected the view that specific standards could be set defining
the limits of the delegation of power to public agencies consistently in every
case.' 39 Instead, he argued that there were "practical considerations" that should
motivate a court's decision as to whether or not there has been an unconstitutional
delegation of power in a case. 4 The considerations that seemed particularly
applicable to the delegation of power to a private arbitrator were: (1) whether or
not reference to established legal concepts has the effect of limiting discretion;' 4'
(2) whether or not judicial review is available to correct abuses; 14 2 (3) whether
or not there is an obvious need for expertise in a particular area which the
legislature does not have; 43 and (4) whether or not it is traditional in a particular
field to delegate such power'"
Following this general pattern, Justice Williams refined Professor Cooper's
considerations into a "balancing test" of public accountability applicable to the
delegation of power to a private labor arbitrator. 14 The applicable criteria were:
(1) the proximity of those performing the delegated duty to the elective process;
134. See id. at 263 (Williams, J., dissenting), for an alternative view of "public accountability"
of governmental employees.
135. Kanowitz, supra note 64, at 300.
136. COOPER, supra note 68, at 31-91.
137. Id at 53. Professor Cooper believes that the "decision as to what limits shall be placed on
such delegations must be predicated on a painstaking, case-by-case appraisal, weighing the advantages
of such delegation against the hazards involved." Id
138. Id. at 31-91.
139. Id at 71-72.
140. Id. at 73.
141. Id at 74.
142. Id at 81.
143. Id at 83.
144. Id at 75.
145. Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d at 263 (Williams, I., dissenting).
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(2) sufficiency of the standards of delegation and judicial review; (3) length of the
tenure of arbitrators and character of the job; and (4) limits of the power
delegated.' By using these criteria in future cases, courts can weigh the
interests of public employer-employeerelations, which are furthered by arbitration,
against the necessary public accountability of the democratic form of government
as required by the Constitution."4 While courts and judges should not "balance
away" constitutional guarantees, Justice Williams' view seems to be the most
practical in terms of recognizing the need for realism and efficiency in the running
of the government.
Consequently, instead of relying on the decision in Taylor or dismissing the
constitutional issue altogether, the Rapid Transit court should have used Justice
Williams' balancing test. The sufficiency of the criteria could have been
determined from the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the
District. The criteria could then have been applied to decide whether the use of
compulsory arbitration as provided in the agreement was a constitutional
delegation of governmental power. Such a determination would have been a more
satisfactory discussion of the issue than the Rapid Transit court chose to set forth.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are differences between the resolution of labor disputes in private
enterprises and in public agencies which should be recognized by courts in
deciding when to mandate arbitration according to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. But these differences are not great enough to discount
compulsory arbitration of disputes as an effective resolution technique between
government controlled public agencies and their employees. The court in Rapid
Transit realized the advantages to the government agency and its employees in
using arbitration to resolve labor disputes, and the court correctly mandated the use




147. Id. at 266.
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